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2
Whiteness as Capital:
Constructing Inclusion and
Defending Privilege
Bernd Reiter

Exclusion is mirrored by inclusion. Thus, instead of focusing on the
mechanisms that produce and reproduce exclusion, in this chapter I analyze
the mechanisms and strategies used by those historically included to defend
their privileged access to crucial resources and a system of rights that upholds
their status as first-class citizens in contrast to the second-class citizenship of
the excluded. According to James Holston and Teresa Caldeira (1998: 276), in
Brazil, “The protections and immunities civil rights are intended to ensure as
constitutional norms are generally perceived and experienced as privileges of
elite social statuses and thus of limited access. They are not, in other words,
appreciated as common rights of citizenship.” Whiteness functions as an important capital in the construction of social status because it overdetermines
those able to claim it and it indicates an elevated position in the existing social
hierarchies (Reiter 2009a: 5).
Discussing the ways that inequality is maintained and reproduced in Brazilian society is highly relevant to the discussion of Brazilian democracy, because although Brazil’s political system is troubled, its social problems are by
far worse and more consequential. In their treatment of Brazilian democracy,
authors like Diamond (1999), Linz and Stepan (1996), Mainwaring (1997), and
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) typically point to a weak party system and
problems resulting from an unstable balance between parliamentary and presidential systems as the causes for unfinished democratic consolidation in
Brazil. Although this approach has improved our understanding of the importance of institutional settings to achieve certain outcomes, such analyses only
provide partial answers to the question of why Brazilian democracy has remained shallow, exclusionary, elitist, and plagued by a seemingly neverending string of political scandals. The debate over which political institutional
settings are more likely to improve the functioning of democratic systems runs
19
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the risk of confounding means with ends, because although institutions are important to provide incentives and channel expectations, they cannot guarantee
a desired outcome.
By the same token, although states must be seen as important and partially
autonomous actors, most authors following the pathbreaking work of Evans,
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) have overestimated state autonomy and
neglected the relationship between autonomous states and the societies into
which states are embedded. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985: 9) were
certainly right when pointing out that “states conceived as organizations
claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals
that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups,
classes, or society.” Many researchers following this tradition, however, have
transformed malfunctioning states into independent variables in their explanations of broader outcomes, such as the failing of democracies. By focusing on
structure alone they have neglected the very raison d’être of structures, namely
their function of reproducing processes.
Although Brazil’s democracy undoubtedly suffers from the shortcomings of
its political system, the gravest impediments to consolidating Brazilian democracy are not of a political, but of a social, nature. Weak state structures cannot
explain the much broader problem of extremely distorted and skewed processes
that characterize the daily interactions and communications that occur and characterize Brazilian society and the interactions between society and the state.
Accordingly, it is not the failing state that causes Brazil’s democracy to
fall short of its promises, but the extreme societal inequalities that distort communicative processes of Brazilian society and hence provide the Brazilian
state with too much autonomy from the will and needs of its majority and not
enough autonomy from the interests of a relatively affluent minority. Due to extreme inequality, distorting the quality of societal processes in Brazilian society, privileged groups have long captured the state and used it to advance their
goals without feeling or effectively being accountable to the masses. I thus
propose to test the usefulness of treating societal inequality as the independent
variable for explaining Brazil’s faltering democratic regime.
To achieve this goal, which implies a shift of optics, it becomes necessary
to step beyond the disciplinary limits of mainstream political science and integrate the work of other social sciences, because it appears that many of the
limitations of currently available approaches in political science result from a
narrow scope of research that is not necessarily dictated by the need for stringency, but by accepted borders of the discipline. Imprisoned by disciplinary
borders, many social scientists seek out empirical examples that help prove or
falsify their discipline-based theories, instead of developing explanations and
models that are able to take into account a more complex reality. In short, our
aim as researchers should be to adapt our theories and explanations to reality,
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and not seek out segments of reality that fit into our conceptual frameworks.
State autonomy and new institutionalism cannot provide reliable answers to all
questions related to democracy and democratization. So instead of making reality fit the confinements imposed by mainstream political science theory, I
seek to take adequate account of the different available theoretical frameworks
for the analysis of a necessarily complex reality. Insights and theoretical frameworks borrowed from history and sociology have proven especially helpful for
this endeavor. The work of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1996) on the
general functioning of social systems provides the entrance point for an analysis of the nature of embeddedness, as well as the interactions between the political system and broader society.
Power in Brazilian Society

Understanding the impact of societal inequality on Brazilian democracy requires a detailed understanding of the centrality of inequality in structuring the
daily routines and the quality of interactions and processes of Brazilian society and its everyday reality. I contend that inequality is indeed the main structuring force of Brazilian society. The core reason for this is that inequality is
functional to the maintenance of privilege of historically privileged sectors of
Brazilian society, a group I call the included. To capture the workings of inequality, one needs to focus on the historically included and the strategies they
apply to uphold inequality, and through inequality defend their privileged access
to crucial resources and rights. Focusing on the included also helps to correct
a very common mistake of reification, routinely committed by social scientists. By constantly examining the excluded, sociologists and anthropologists,
in particular, have contributed to creating them as a problem and have helped
consolidate the erroneous idea that there is something wrong with the poor, the
indigenous, blacks, or other historically marginalized groups.
To be exact, by focusing on the excluded, social scientists involuntarily
help the included to escape analysis. They also risk becoming functional to the
ongoing process of consolidating the idea that blacks, indigenous groups,
women, homosexuals, and the poor are Others, whereas the included represent
the norm. In my own empirical research, I consistently found nothing to be
wrong with the excluded and a lot to be wrong with the included. A shift of
focus away from the excluded and onto the included thus necessitates a shift
away from an anthropological gaze focused on those historically constructed
as Others and a redirection of focus onto the men and women who have the
power to decide what counts as right or wrong, normal or deviant, beautiful or
ugly, worthy or unworthy of social esteem, and who is to be considered an
equal participant in the public sphere and who is not.1

22

Black Empowerment and White Privilege

A first implication, or maybe complication, resulting from this shift of optics is the question, who are the included? Everybody knows who the excluded
are, but it is very difficult to find a good definition of the included. Political
scientists have traditionally dealt with this problem by differentiating between
social and political elites and the masses, or the people, by analytically separating the rulers from the ruled. Sociologists have long drawn sophisticated
pyramids and “onions” to explain the inner divisions of societies, sometimes
creating sophisticated diagrams constructed on the basis of income, wealth,
status, and patterns of consumption.2
The problem with all these attempts, which becomes immediately apparent to anyone conducting empirical research, is that when asked, almost everybody self-identifies as belonging to the middle class. Almost no one ever
self-identifies as belonging to the elite. Avoiding self-classification as belonging to the elite must be seen as part of a strategy to evade being classified and
examined, and this strategy is a common repertoire among privileged groups.
Doing so, included groups obfuscate their relative power and their elevated
position in existent social hierarchies and avoid scrutiny and potential blame.
To avoid comparison that might lead to being considered elite and therefore to
being blamed for existing social and political problems, most members of included groups, instead of comparing their life situation to that of the majority
of the country, apply a much broader domain for comparing their income,
wealth, and general lifestyle. Among Brazilian elites, this domain habitually
includes international comparisons to middle classes in much richer countries
of per capita incomes on average ten times higher than Brazil, typically the
United States or countries of the European Union (EU). Comparing themselves
to US or European middle classes, included Brazilians avoid comparison with
the national average and the situation of most Afro-Brazilians and native
Brazilians. Hence, earning R$3,000 a month as a university professor is not a
lot when compared to the salary of full professors in the United States, where
per capita GDPs are approximately US$46,000; however, in Brazil, where the
per capita GDP is approximately US$9,700 (in 2008, at purchasing power parity), earning R$3,000 per month (about US$1,500 in 2008) is reserved for a small
elite. By using international, rather than national, comparisons, Brazilian elites
thus reiterate a postcolonial frame of reference, as many included Brazilians
are more familiar with the lifestyle of Europe or the United States than with the
living conditions of blacks or indigenous groups in their own country.
The capacity to escape classification is unequally distributed in any society. The poor, stigmatized, and historically marginalized, in most cases, do not
have the choice to opt out of a system that makes them the objects of inquiry
and exposes them to the classifying and hierarchizing gaze of the included
classifier. The phenomenon of avoiding self-classification as a member of the
elite has three important analytical consequences. First, it points to the necessity
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to use subjective, instead of objective, categories of social stratification. Inclusion, just like exclusion, is not absolute, but relative to other groups in society,
mainly the excluded groups, and becomes absolute in perspective. Inclusion is
not an absolute phenomenon and must be understood and analyzed in relation
to exclusion. Second, inclusion, just like exclusion, is multidimensional and
must have, at the minimum, economic and cultural dimensions, and these two
dimensions must be interrelated.3 Third, inclusion is maintained on the interpersonal and subjective level and reproduced in daily interactions among different groups. I will elaborate on each of these three consequences.
In the absence of specific literature on inclusion, the vast literature on exclusion, inequality, and injustice provides initial insights. Judith Butler (1998:
41), for example, asks rhetorically, “Is it possible to distinguish, even analytically, between a lack of cultural recognition and a material oppression, when
the very definition of legal ‘personhood’ is rigorously circumscribed by cultural norms that are indissociable from their material effects?” For Butler, the
answer is no. In her essay, she explains that the cultural and material are indeed intimately intertwined. She traces this insight back to Marx’s German
Ideology (1846) and Engels’s Origin of Family, Private Property, and the State
(1884). Marx points to the connection of the mode of production that produces
a certain and corresponding mode of cooperation and social organization.4
Much of Butler’s critique takes issue with Nancy Fraser’s distinction between injustices of distribution and injustices of recognition. Fraser (1998) argues that both kinds of injustices are equally serious, but that they operate
differently. For Fraser, to be misrecognized means “to be denied the status of
a full partner in social interaction and prevented from participating as a peer
in social life—not as a consequence of a distributive inequity (such as failing
to receive one’s fair share of resources or ‘primary goods’), but rather as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem (Fraser 1998: 141).”
Accordingly, Fraser defines misrecognition as an “institutionalized social relation, not a psychological state” (Fraser 1998: 141). Fraser also points to the
connection she makes between the symbolic and the material. For her, “the
norms, significations, and constructions of personhood that impede women,
racialized peoples, and/or gays and lesbians from parity of participation in social
life are materially instantiated—in institutions and social practices, in social
action and embodied habitus, and yes, in ideological state apparatuses. Far
from occupying some wispy, ethereal realm, they are material in their existence and effects” (Fraser 1998: 144). This discussion is confusing in that it
mixes epistemological with ontological claims, but no matter how the material
and the cultural relate in real life, the Butler-Fraser debate clearly demonstrates that exclusion can be separated into two analytical dimensions for the
sake of gaining a better understanding of how they work. It necessarily follows
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that inclusion can also be usefully divided into two separate analytical realms,
namely as constituted by material and symbolic or cultural variables. I will
first focus on the material dimensions of inclusion.
Material Dimensions of Inclusion

In the absence of data on inclusion, the vast amount of data and analysis of exclusion in Brazil provides important clues for constructing a working definition and an analytical framework for the included. Initial insights can be gained,
for example, from a comparison of educational data. Data from the PNAD, the
Brazilian household survey conducted annually, demonstrate that a consistent
gap of nearly two years in schooling separates white Brazilians from black
Brazilians during the years of 1993 and 2004 (Reiter 2009a: 56). Although educational levels in general have been slowly rising in Brazil, the gap that separates white from black Brazilians has remained the same. Along with skin color
as a clear indicator for inclusion, these data also suggest that having completed
at least twelve years of formal education sets one part of the population apart
from the other. Being white and having completed at least twelve years of formal education are therefore strong indicators of inclusion. The fact that over
80 percent of Brazilians attend public schools alludes to the fact that attending
a private middle or high school is reserved for only a select few and makes it
a strong indicator of inclusion.
Another criterion to differentiate between included and excluded groups
can be elaborated by comparing income and wealth disparities. According to
the same source (PNAD), in 2004, 41.7 percent of Brazilian blacks and 19.5
percent of whites were poor. In the poorer regions, for example the northeast,
56.7 percent of all blacks and 44.6 percent of all whites were poor.5 Being poor,
that is, living with less than one-half per capita minimum wage per month, is
therefore a condition that characterizes between 40 and 56 percent of all
Brazilians. In other words, it is the Brazilian norm. Not being poor, accordingly, is a privilege in Brazil and represents not the norm, but the exception.
Given that the average monthly per capita income in Brazil in 2004 was R$586
(less than US$280), it follows that all those earning more than R$600 per
month are a minority and are likely to belong to the group of the included. In
2006, R$100 equaled US$48.
In a country with extremely high unemployment rates, especially when
the percentage of the economically active population working in the informal
sector is considered, having a regular job must be seen as another characteristic of the included. Research on the informal sector in the city of Salvador has
demonstrated that about 40 percent of the economically active Bahian population works in precarious jobs of the informal sector. These jobs do not offer any
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job security, health coverage, unemployment, or retirement benefits.6 Having a
regular job that offers job security and benefits is therefore another indicator
that characterizes the included.
Additional indicators to characterize the included can be gained from reversing data on digital exclusion, that is, the number of households with telephones and personal computers. According to the Brazilian Institute for Applied
Research in Economics (IPEA) in 2004, 23 percent of white-headed households
and 8 percent of black-headed households had a personal computer at home.
Furthermore, 60 percent of black households and 40 percent of white households
had no telephone. Accordingly, having a telephone serves as a criterion to characterize included sectors, and having a personal computer must be seen as an extreme privilege in Brazil, only open to a small minority of Brazilians.
One last material criterion to differentiate included from excluded Brazilians is ownership of a car. In 2005, 12 percent of Brazilians owned a car.7
Given the average household size in Brazil of 3.73 persons per household, an
average of 44 percent of Brazilian households owned a car in 2005. This information is complicated by very expressive regional differences in car ownership and by the fact that rich households may own more than one car.
Despite these distortions, it is nevertheless safe to say that the majority of
Brazilian households do not own a car. Not owning a car in Brazil subjects
those affected to severe restrictions with regard to time-efficient mobility and
access to certain exclusive regions (e.g., certain beaches).
These data permit making a first step toward analyzing who the included
Brazilians are and what they look like. When focusing on material dimensions
and comparing national averages, included Brazilians are likely to have a regular
job offering job security and benefits (com carteira assinada), have more than
twelve years of education, earn more than R$600 per capita per month, have a
telephone at home, own a car, and they may own a personal computer. More
likely than not, included Brazilians successfully claim to be white. Although
this is a very crude assessment of inclusion that does not further differentiate
among included groups, it provides a first step toward a more sophisticated
analysis.
Symbolic Dimensions of Inclusion: Whiteness as Capital

In Brazil, whiteness is an extremely desirable characteristic and, as we have
seen, a strong indicator for inclusion. Brazilian history is marked by state-led
efforts to whiten the nation, which was seen as a necessary condition for achieving civilizational progress. But the national project of whitening ultimately
failed, as not enough northern Europeans were willing to settle in Brazil to
whiten the nation (Lesser 1999). In addition, Brazilian elites themselves had
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long been exposed to racial mixing, which by their own standards and, according to some European and North American visitors, endangered their prospects
of catching up to the civilized European ideal.
Whiteness, anything but a biological reality, is used as a symbolic indicator of civilizing potential.8 Lesser (1999) demonstrates that what it meant to be
white shifted in Brazil between 1850 and 1950, but whiteness remained a cultural category, signifying superiority and well-deserved privilege. Brazilian
elites openly discussed and compared the different degrees of whiteness of such
potential immigrants as Arabs, Japanese, and southern Europeans, associating
whiteness with aptitude (Lesser 1999). The idea of whiteness was therefore
constructed and used as a form of capital, strongly associated with merit and
progressive, developmental potential. But claiming to be white was not a viable
option for all.
During the 1930s, Brazilian elites found a solution to the problem of reluctant whitening by embracing the doctrine of racial mixing, proposed by
Freyre’s influential work The Masters and the Slaves, first published in 1933.
Freyre’s work provided a welcome solution for the racially impure Brazilian
elites who “wished to be white and feared they were not” (Stepan 1991: 45).
The 1930s was a time of populism and nationalism, under the extended rule of
Getúlio Vargas, who was president from 1930 to 1937, dictator from 1937 to
1945, and again president from 1951 to 1954. Freyre’s work allowed for a
strategy of incorporating Afro-Brazilians into the imagined Brazilian community instead of separating or isolating them. Placing them at the bottom of the
social hierarchy, this integration demanded from Afro-Brazilians, and any
other group that potentially stood in the way of Vargas’s project of building
one nation, a complete negation of cultural distinctiveness. For the nationalistic state, Freyre’s vision offered a solution not only for integrating former
slaves; it also provided the slightly nonwhite members of the newly emerging
urban elites with a way to save their own status. As well, this form of integration blocked any kind of separate group formation and therefore was very
functional in suffocating the formation of collective grievances even before
they could arise. When Freyre’s theories were transformed into official state
doctrine, Brazil became a racial democracy, populated by only one race,
namely the mulatto. Freyre’s theories served the project of nation building
under the Vargas regime, offering a founding ideology upon which the Brazilian elites could imagine themselves, as it allowed them to cope with the historical fact of far-reaching biological mixing without abandoning European
cultural values, which served as the guiding values for themselves and the nation. It also undermined Afro-Brazilian solidarity and mobilization, as under
such a system, upward social mobility had to be achieved through the assimilation of European values, manners, and aesthetics. In other words, through
this move, Brazilian values and social hierarchies could remain monolithic and
European despite the country’s biological and cultural diversity. During the
1930s, Brazil became a tropical Europe.
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After the 1930s, the corporatist political institutions that sustained Brazilian social and racial hierarchies were never effectively restructured, which
would have allowed for a reconfiguration of traditional social hierarchies. Instead, the Brazilian military, joined by state elites, avoided such an attempt at
restructuring with a military coup in 1964, when the threat of social revolution
became imminent, carried by an emerging class-consciousness among urban
workers of the industrial south. The military coup not only avoided social restructuring, it also blocked the formation of a separate group identity, in this
case class-based (Erickson 1977). Instead, during military rule (1964 to 1985),
Brazilian social hierarchies were perpetuated, as great parts of the Brazilian
population remained marginalized from participating in political and civic life.
Although the analyses provided by Erickson (1977) and Wiarda (1981) do
not address the racial dynamics that permeate the Brazilian social body, their
analyses nevertheless allow for the conclusion that those at the top of the
Brazilian social and political body used whiteness as a tool to legitimate their
privileges. Afro-Brazilians remained at the bottom of social hierarchies and
dark skin complexion remained a signifier of low status, making all blacks suspect of being poor and potentially dangerous. This perception of Afro-Brazilians
is so deeply rooted in Brazilians’ perception that it has escaped scrutiny. It has
become one of the ways Brazilians make sense of their everyday reality. Simpson (1993), in her study about “The Mega-Marketing of Gender, Race, and
Modernity,” demonstrates how in Brazil a “normalizing” discourse continuously associates whiteness with merit and blackness with unworthiness and
danger.9 Simpson analyzes the career of Xuxa, an ex-playmate and ex-soft-porn
star emerging in the 1980s, who later became Brazil’s most famous TV star,
hosting afternoon prime-time programs for children. Simpson argues that, “in
her celebration of whiteness, Xuxa not only taps deep and jealously guarded
feelings among Brazilians about race but also asserts the validity of a nearly
universal ideological construction wherein the blond female is presented as the
‘most prized possession of white patriarchy.’”10
Whiteness is a highly desirable good to all those that are able to claim it
with success. Because of Brazil’s long history of associating whiteness with
civilizational potential, whiteness has developed into the strongest marker of
elevated social status. It symbolizes education and holding a regular job. Additionally, most Brazilians almost automatically associate it with being
middle-class, having money, owning a car, and having access to other private
services, most importantly private education.
Relational Aspects of Inclusion

As stated above, inclusion is not only multidimensional, it is also relational.
This insight goes back to Hegel’s classic discussion of the master-slave relationship. According to social psychologist Henri Tajfel (Tajfel and Turner
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1986), groups constitute themselves in relation to other individuals and groups.
A sense of identity is fostered through the drawing of borders that separate those
inside from those outside. This drawing of borders not only permits the effective separation of one group into two or more, it also constitutes each group
with reference to the others. Tajfel’s main dialectic insight was that one group
can only exist by defining itself as different from another. Difference and identity are constituted together. The economist Fred Hirsch (1976) has added another component to this insight. In his book on the Social Limits to Growth,
Hirsch points out that certain goods are relational. He refers to these as “positional goods” that can be defined as goods that derive their value not from their
absolute position, but rather from their relative position to others. Hirsch argues in the case of education that if everyone has access to higher education,
the effect of leading to better jobs is thereby neutralized. Job requirements
simply rise, making higher investment necessary, giving the better-off an advantage over the less well-off. At the same time, the cost in terms of investment required to have the same outcome rise is a process he calls “screening”
(Hirsch 1976: 41). When overall educational levels rise, a job formerly open
to high school graduates now demands a college degree. The maintenance of
the privilege of access resides in a better starting position. The traditional included are able to maintain their distance from the historically excluded by
simply raising the value of the positional good. Historically excluded groups
will therefore never be able to catch up. Under such circumstances, education
becomes a means to create and protect social prestige, potentially losing all of
its emancipatory potential and its functionality of producing knowledge. It becomes a sticker that is displayed as a marker of social distinction.
Hegel’s and Hirsch’s work alerts us to the fact that even though educational
standards might grow in absolute terms, the historically included are likely to
maintain the distance that separates them from the historically excluded. Under
conditions of increased competition in very scarce markets, border maintenance
becomes extremely important, because it provides the historically included with
additional financial, social, and cultural capital. In short, inclusion can only produce the desired effect if it is contrasted with exclusion. Maintaining one’s own
inclusion therefore requires maintaining the exclusion of others.
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of distinction provides
an entrance point for conceptualizing whiteness as highly effective capital,
functioning in a social space that is constituted in relation to other social positions, where each one uses the other for reference. Although Bourdieu ignores
ethnicity and race entirely in his theory, his thoughts on gender point to a direction that allows further development. He argues that “the volume and composition of capital give specific form and value to the determinations which
the other factors (age, sex, place of residence, etc.) impose on practices. Sexual
properties are as inseparable from class practices as the yellowness of a lemon
is from its acidity: a class is defined in an essential respect by the place and
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value it gives to the sexes and to their socially constituted dispositions” (Bourdieu 1984: 107).
In this way, whiteness constitutes a capital in addition to the other capitals
Bourdieu detects, namely financial, social, and cultural. Their importance,
however, does not follow a simple additive logic. One capital rather connects
to the others and together they determine the social place an individual will
hold in a society. This allows for some flexibility, as one capital can be used
to partly compensate for the lack of another, although this flexibility is limited
precisely by the grouped condition of the different capitals. In that way, as
Bourdieu points out correctly, each single capital tends to overdetermine the
social position of its carrier, as the presence or absence of each single one is
perceived as being indicative of the presence or absence of the others. It is in
this sense that whiteness overdetermines its carrier, bestowing on him a social
position that might not be warranted. Because of the composite character of
the different capitals, whiteness signals the presence of other capitals, even
though they might not be present. Blackness, at the same time, signifies the absence of other capitals and equally overdetermines its carrier.
The resulting social position then becomes a social expectation and reflects back on the carrying individual. “The homogeneity of the disposition associated with a position and their seemingly miraculous adjustment to the
demands inscribed in it result partly from the mechanisms which channel towards positions individuals who are already adjusted to them, either because
they feel ‘made’ for jobs that are ‘made’ for them . . . or because they are seen
in this light by the occupants of the posts . . . and partly from the dialectic
which is established, throughout a lifetime, between dispositions and positions, aspirations and achievements” (Bourdieu 1984: 110). In other words, individuals tend to conform to the social positions they hold and to internalize
the role expectations associated with these positions.
What matters, then, is not the objective position an individual holds in the
social space, but the subjective experience of living with and through this position and rather having to uphold and defend it in daily interactions, or trying
to change or masquerade it to escape the negative effects resulting from potential overdetermination. Defending or challenging one’s social place is a daily
struggle and bears very tangible consequences for one’s capabilities to live life.
In sum, given that inclusion is relational and works on the subjective,
rather than the objective, level, statistical data can only provide very basic approximations to begin with. The more important dimension of defining one’s
inclusion vis-à-vis the exclusion of others must operate on a symbolic level.
To reproduce a social structure that secures privileges and advantages to one
group and denies it to others, the maintenance of the border that marks inclusion and separates it from exclusion becomes extremely important. It therefore
does not come as a surprise that Brazilian daily life is full of symbolic acts to
fulfill this border-maintenance function. This is even more the case where racial
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capital is not clearly demarcated and, therefore, illusive for providing clear
borders of belonging, as under conditions of uncertainty, people will be more
anxious to demarcate their belonging to one group or the other.
State and Society

Once we have reached an understanding of the mechanisms and processes that
characterize Brazilian society and dominate everyday reality, we are equipped
to examine how these processes that lead to the reproduction of inclusion and
exclusion affect Brazilian democracy. The last part of this chapter thus offers
a reflection on the ways in which political systems interact, and are influenced
by, the broader social system into which they are embedded. My main argument is that state autonomy only refers to the operational structures of states—
their institutions and bureaucracy. Nevertheless, states can only reproduce the
processes of broader society. The work of Luhmann (1996) helps clarify the
relationship between societies and states and also sheds light on the nature and
extent of embeddedness.
The main argument I seek to advance with this analysis is that it is impossible to have a democratic (political) subsystem embedded in an undemocratic broader societal system. The reasons for this impossibility are many, and
they operate on different levels (individual, family, and group). From a systemic
standpoint, any subsystem operates by using and transforming the processes
from its environment. The basic operation of any system, according to Luhmann, is the reduction of complexity and the creation of internal sense by imposing ordering principles onto the different processes, or media, in Luhmann’s
terms. A political subsystem is operationally autonomous (or “autopoetic”),
but subject to operate using the media it finds in its broader environment. The
medium of society, according to Habermas (1984), is communication. In the
case of the state, the main medium is power. Hence, a state can operate autonomously in any type of society by creating an internal structure (a bureaucracy)
that allows it to reduce complexity; establish, through its internal structure,
criteria able to create internal homogeneity; and maintain its own border. But
again, the media, or processes, that are available to do so originate in its environment. The immediate environment of any political subsystem is the broader
societal system, although it also contains other political systems, other societal
systems, and, to some extent, an incipient broader political system of worldwide reach (there are, however, no signs of an emerging worldwide societal
system). If the medium of communication, which structures the societal system, is skewed and distorted by extreme inequality and the distorting exercise
of power, then the state is likely to reproduce this distortion. In other words, a
political subsystem embedded in a society whose main structuring force is the
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reproduction of inequality will necessarily reproduce inequality in its own internal operations, as well as in the outcomes it produces.
Thus, to capture the workings, achievements, potentials, failures, and shortcomings of states, instead of focusing exclusively on the internal processes that
together constitute its operational structure, one needs to focus on two additional elements. First is the nature and content of the quality of processes, that
is, the media used for internal communication within the system. Second, one
needs to include an analysis of the broader societal system and other subsystems constituting the environment into which the subsystem of the state is embedded to capture the whole picture. After all, the subsystem of the state
constitutes itself by processing information from its environment, reducing
complexity, and thus differentiating itself from its environment.
How can these rather abstract categories be applied to the analysis of Brazilian democracy? An analysis of the quality of processes that constitute Brazil’s
broader society is needed. If the processes that constitute a society are extremely skewed and inequality becomes the main structuring force of a society,
then inequalities pollute the operation of the state system, which ends up reproducing them.11 Understanding how inequality structures a society thus leads
us to an understanding of the ways that states reproduce these inequalities. In
the case of Brazil, if the struggle over access and privilege is the main characteristic of its broader society, the Brazilian state will necessarily reproduce the
mechanisms and processes associated with this struggle, because although
structurally autonomous, the state relies on the processes of broader society as
core media for its functioning.
Indeed, the Brazilian state has been consistently plagued by political scandal ever since its redemocratization was completed in 1985. The main trait of
these political scandals can easily be detected as a spillover of societal inequalities into the political system, which typically takes the form of establishing
patron-client relationships. Clientelism thus became an endemic phenomenon
of post-1985 Brazilian democracy, where political officeholders use their office
not to serve the general public, but as a tool to establish their own membership
in the group of the included. Once there, instead of perceiving themselves—
and being perceived by the majority—as public servants, they become arbitrary
administrators of privatized public goods. Once in office, state representatives,
as well as higher-ranking bureaucrats, join the political class, a term that reflects their elevated status as belonging to a distinctive group. As members of
the political class, or even simply as administrators of power, they reproduce
their belonging to a privileged group by differentiating it from those that do
not. Disrespect, clientelism, nepotism, and the like are thus manifestations of
a problem that has much deeper roots and a much more diversified repertoire,
which routinely includes manipulation, intimidation, infantilization, and cooptation of the historically excluded.
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Conclusion: Inclusion, the Society, and the State

Taken together, the concept of inclusion has material and symbolic dimensions. Whiteness is a crucial element of its construction, as it overdetermines
those able to claim it with success. Most importantly, inclusion functions in relation vis-à-vis exclusion, and, as such, it requires the maintenance of exclusion to be effective. Being effective refers to its ability to demarcate the social
terrain of all the included. This terrain is homogeneous and depends critically
on its border maintenance. If individuals that are not clearly identifiable as
included penetrate its borders, inclusion runs the risks of losing its main function, namely to secure and defend privilege. The main importance of conceptualizing inclusion is that it allows for an analysis of the strategies used by
historically privileged groups to maintain their inherited privilege. In addition
to its analytical power, inclusion has an ontological dimension, because
Brazilians actively apply strategies to reproduce inclusion through exclusion.
The effects and outcomes of applying these strategies bear very real and tangible outcomes for all those affected by them. Inequality also penetrates the
state, because states are structurally embedded in societies and rely on the
processes, or media, produced in broader societies for their interaction, constitution of identity, and the creation of institutions. These institutions provide
the structures that guide and channel the substratum of their agency, namely
processes, or media, but they cannot change them. In the final analysis, the
struggle over privilege characterizes the quality of daily interactions in Brazilian society, and hence distorts the quality of societal processes in broader society, as well as the processes that constitute the interactions within its political
system.
Notes
1. I am, of course, influenced by Foucault’s analysis of “Discipline and Punish”
and his analysis of the different ways power influences our societal relationships.
2. Pierre Bourdieu (1984) undoubtedly advanced our understanding of the inner
divisions of societies when he offered his own diagram of social distinction based on
group-specific habitus.
3. The most helpful discussion about the interrelation between economic and cultural exclusion is also the most helpful for the discussion of inclusion, namely the seminal articles written by Nancy Fraser (1998: 140–149) and Judith Butler (1998: 33–43).
4. Engels wrote, “According to the materialist conception, the determining factor
in history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction of immediate life.
This, again, is of a twofold character: on the one side, the production of the means of
existence, of food, clothing, and shelter and the tools necessary for that production; on
the other side, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the
species” (quoted from Butler 1998: 41).
5. Being poor is defined by Brazilian convention as earning less than one-half a
minimum wage per capita, i.e., less than R$175 (US$80) per month.
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6. Luiza Bairros, Vanda Sá Barreto, and Nadya Castro, 1992.
7. Global Auto Report, August 2006, www.scotiabank.com.
8. Harris (1993), studying race relations in the United States, demonstrates how
symbolical whiteness was constructed and used in the United States as a form of capital to justify undeserved privilege.
9. The concept of “normalization,” developed by Michel Foucault (1995), refers
to the elevation of whiteness to a standard against which other groups have to be measured. Selden (2000) uses a similar approach when writing about Eugenics and the Social Construction of Merit, Race, and Disability in the United States.
10. Simpson (1993: 8). Simpson’s quote is from Dyer (1986).
11. Although inequality is inherent to the operation of power, and states necessarily reproduce inequality, states reproduce more inequality, the more a society is structured by inequality.

